How come nothing changed?:Reflections on the fasting-time project by Hertzum, Morten & Simonsen, Jesper
Roskilde
University
How come nothing changed?
Reflections on the fasting-time project
Hertzum, Morten; Simonsen, Jesper
Published in:






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Hertzum, M., & Simonsen, J. (2020). How come nothing changed? Reflections on the fasting-time project. In L.
B. Pape-Haugaard, C. Lovis, I. C. Madsen, P. Weber, P. H. Nielsen, & P. Scott (Eds.), Digital Personalized
Health and Medicine - Proceedings of MIE 2020 (pp. 971-975). IOS Press. Studies in Health Technology and
Informatics Vol. 270 https://doi.org/10.3233/SHTI200306
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Dec. 2021
How Come Nothing Changed? Reflections 
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Abstract. Many healthcare interventions fail to produce the intended effect. In this 
paper we look back at the fasting-time project, which aimed to shorten patients’ 
preoperative fasting times. However, the project failed to achieve this effect, even 
though it had been identified and prioritized by the clinicians at the studied 
hospital. A set of mutually reinforcing factors collectively explain why the project 
failed to produce change. The four main factors are: lack of urgency, risk aversion, 
day-to-day busyness, and lack of managerial commitment at the department level. 
The simultaneous presence of these factors complicates efforts to counter them. 
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1.Introduction 
It is nontrivial to improve hospital practices by introducing new information systems 
and new ways of working. Diffusion-of-innovations theory states that for an innovation 
to be adopted it must, among other things, be compatible, avoid complexity, provide 
relative advantage, and be actively championed by people such as opinion leaders [1]. 
Technology-acceptance research finds that for systems to be adopted and used they 
must be perceived as useful, easy to use, and even enjoyable [2]. Reviews of the 
implementation of electronic health records confirm many of these factors and add 
factors such as adaptability, data migration, implementation climate, management, 
organizational readiness, planning, staff training, and external policy and incentives 
[3][4]. In this study, we look back at a project that failed to produce the intended effect, 
even though the clinicians had themselves identified and prioritized this effect. 
The project [5] concerned the reduction of patients’ preoperative fasting times. To 
reduce the risk of pulmonary aspiration due to vomiting during anesthesia, patients 
must fast for six hours prior to surgical operations. Fasting times in excess of six hours 
should, if possible, be avoided to reduce postoperative complications and patient 
discomfort. But avoiding fasting times in excess of six hours presupposes efficient 
coordination among the involved clinicians. Organizationally, the fasting-time project 
was to introduce new procedures for recording fasting times and acting on long fasting 
times. Technologically, the project was to utilize a network of electronic whiteboards 
for recording, and visualizing, how long the individual patient had fasted. In the 
following, we first summarize the method and results of the project, then we reflect on 
why the project failed to produce shorter preoperative fasting times. 
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The effort to improve the coordination of operations, and thereby reduce fasting times, 
was a participatory-design project conducted by the authors and a group of staff from a 
hospital in Denmark. The project followed an effects-driven approach [6]. That is, the 
project consisted of specifying the purpose of the project in terms of an effect, realizing 
this effect through technical and organizational changes, assessing the extent to which 
the specified effect had been achieved, and iterating to achieve a fuller realization of 
the effect. Table 1 gives the timeline of our empirical activities. 
We started with four workshops (a total of 10 hours) during which clinicians from 
different departments and staff groups at the hospital specified and prioritized the 
effects to be achieved in the project. The effect of reducing preoperative fasting times 
received top priority. After these workshops, a small group was established. It 
consisted of the authors, three staff members (a nurse from the operating ward and a 
secretary from each of the two surgical departments), and a research assistant. This 
group met for 16 participatory-design meetings (35 hours) to realize and assess the 
fasting-time effect. In between the meetings the three staff members worked to 
implement the group’s decisions in their departments. The group meetings were 
supplemented with observation (70 hours) of how the operations were coordinated at 
the hospital. During the effects assessment, fasting times were recorded and visualized 
for three months. 
Table 1. Timeline of the empirical activities, which spanned the period September 2014 – December 2015 
Date Activity 
Phase 1: effects specification 
Sep 18 Workshop with 5 clinicians and a hospital IT project manager to specify effects 
Sep 26 Workshop with 10 clinicians and a hospital IT project manager to specify effects 
Nov 7 Workshop with 7 clinicians to specify effects 
Dec 12 Workshop with 9 clinicians to prioritize and elaborate effects 
Phase 2: effects realization 
Feb 17 Group meeting to kick off the realization of the fasting-time effect 
Feb 20 Group meeting to plan the project activities and begin defining fasting time in detail 
Feb 26 Observation at surgical departments to get a sense of the coordination of operations 
Feb 27 Observation at operating ward to get a sense of the coordination of operations 
Mar 6 Group meeting to define fasting time (and how to record it) in detail 
Mar 17 Workshop with whiteboard vendor to configure the fasting-time fields 
Mar 27 Group meeting to devise a standard procedure for the recording of fasting times 
Apr 10 Group meeting to ensure the adoption of the whiteboard fields and standard procedure 
Apr 24 Group meeting to promote the project and align it with the current use of the whiteboard 
May 8 Group meeting to finalize the setup of the effects assessment: the fasting-time recordings 
May 22 Group meeting to organize and schedule the follow-up on the fasting-time recordings 
Phase 3: effects assessment 
Jun 4 Group meeting to prepare the next phases and the analysis of the fasting-time recordings 
May 11 - Aug 14 Fasting times recorded and visualized on the whiteboard 
May 18 - Jun 30 Observation at the surgical departments of how fasting times were recorded and used 
Aug 21 Group meeting to validate the fasting-time recordings and brainstorm new interventions 
Sep 4 Group meeting to discuss the fasting-time recordings with department management 
Phase 4: effects realization 
Sep 13 - Oct 4 Observation of whiteboard meetings at the operating ward (four Sundays) 
Sep 18 Group meeting to analyze project progress and identify barriers that curbed progress  
Oct 2 Group meeting to prepare a project presentation and discuss the whiteboard meetings  
Oct 23 Group meeting to analyze project progress and identify barriers that curbed progress 
Nov 5 Group meeting to devise a renewed intervention: daily whiteboard meetings 
Nov 16 - Dec 15 Observation of whiteboard meetings at the operating ward (daily for a month) 
Dec 11 Group meeting to discuss lessons learned by the project group and the hospital at large 
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3.Results 
In brief, the changes made to reduce the patients’ fasting times consisted of (a) defining 
fasting time in meticulous detail, (b) extending the hospital-wide network of electronic 
whiteboards with fields showing each patient’s fasting time, (c) devising a standard 
procedure for the recording of the fasting time on the whiteboard, (d) instituting this 
procedure among the clinicians, (e) bringing fasting times to the attention of staff and 
management, (f) adjusting the instructions given to patients about when to eat for the 
last time before arriving for elective operations, and (g) introducing daily whiteboard 
meetings at the operating ward. During the daily whiteboard meetings, the surgeons 
reviewed the patients scheduled for operation, fine-tuned the schedule to accommodate 
acute operations and reduce fasting times, and had the possibility to order a meal for 
patients who would not be operated within the following six hours. For more detail 
about the changes made to reduce the fasting times, see Simonsen et al. [5]. 
In the period May 11 – August 14, 2015, the fasting time was recorded for 416 
(32%) of the patients who were operated upon during this period of time. The average 
fasting time was 12.8 hours, more than twice the required 6 hours. The top 10% of the 
fasting times were 18-23 hours for acute patients and 16-20 hours for elective patients. 
In assessing the fasting times, a chief physician expressed surprise that they were so 
long, especially for the acute patients. Another chief physician agreed that the fasting 
times were long and likely to cause postoperative complications, such as prolonged 
wound healing. He also asked the pertinent question: “Who assumes responsibility for 
this?” His own tentative answer was that on a daily basis no one really cared about 
long fasting times. Our observations of the daily whiteboard meetings, introduced to 
heighten awareness of fasting times, confirmed this answer: Many clinicians did not 
attend these meetings, and on no occasion did we observe that a meal was ordered for a 
patient who would not be operated within the following six hours. The fasting-time 
project was discontinued in February 2016 without obtaining shorter fasting times. 
4.Discussion 
Looking back at the project we contend that no single factor explains the failure to 
shorten the patients’ preoperative fasting times. Rather, multiple factors interact and 
reinforce each other. The review by Ross et al. [4] makes a similar point, while that by 
Priestman et al. [3] merely catalogs single factors. The simultaneous presence of 
interacting factors complicates any attempt to counter the factors and make change 
happen. In retrospect, we identify four primary and several supplementary factors that 
collectively explain the outcome of the fasting-time project. 
First, the physicians did not experience an urgent need. During the effects 
specification the fasting-time effect was championed by one emergency department 
(ED) physician in particular. This ED physician saw shortened fasting times as an 
indicator of improved preoperative coordination. Furthermore, this physician knew the 
whiteboard technology, which had been in use in the ED for three years prior to its 
introduction throughout the hospital. In the ED the whiteboard had spawned multiple 
process innovations. However, the ED physician did not become a member of the 
fasting-time project group, which throughout the effects realization and assessment 
struggled to obtain buy-in from the physicians. Shortened fasting times never became 
an urgent issue for the physicians for two reasons. First, it did not in itself present a 
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problem they perceived as a threat to their competent performance of their work. In 
spite of clinical evidence that prolonged fasting times cause postoperative 
complications, fasting times remained a matter of discomfort to the patients. Second, 
shortened fasting times did not tie in with a performance indicator the physicians were 
keen to achieve (see below). Improved preoperative coordination was not recognized as 
an important goal, but rather seen as a means. Using the improved coordination as a 
means to attract more patients (who would value waiting less) was discussed favorably 
by hospital management, but was not a goal that motivated the individual physicians. 
While lack of urgency is a recognized barrier to change [7], it is not easily dismantled. 
Second, the surgical department was not prepared to risk idle operation slots. An 
idle operation slot is the situation where an operating room is ready and staffed with a 
surgical team but there is no patient to operate upon. One of the key performance 
indicators at the surgical department was to avoid idle operation slots. To achieve this 
goal, the operations were scheduled so that there would always be two patients ready 
for operation. If it turned out that the first patient could for some reason not be operated 
anyway, then the second could be operated instead. While this practice virtually 
prevented idle operation slots, it prolonged fasting times: In most cases, the first patient 
could be operated upon; the second was not operated until later and faced prolonged 
fasting as a consequence. The practice of always having two patients ready for 
operation was one of the up-front reasons for believing that changes in how operations 
were scheduled could realistically lead to shorter fasting times. However, alternative 
practices that shortened the fasting times increased the risk of occasionally not having 
any surgical patient who had fasted for the required six hours. Although this risk was 
small it was influential because it involved a key performance indicator. The aversion 
of this specific risk may be a conscious priority – filled operation slots over shortened 
fasting times. However, a more general risk aversion stifles any change [8] because 
change, by definition, upsets the status quo and thereby incurs uncertainty and risk. 
Third, the clinicians’ daily schedules left few resources for change efforts. The 
clinicians were busy seeing patients, ordering tests, looking up procedures, keeping 
records, interpreting test results, consulting colleagues, obtaining equipment, and so 
forth. As a somewhat extreme example, one of the surgical chief physicians routinely 
had parallel calendar appointments. These parallel appointments partly indicated his 
stressful work situation and partly increased the stress on his colleagues, who could 
never know which appointments he would attend. A large surplus of time for change 
efforts would have been inappropriate because it would have meant that the hospital 
was not run in a cost-effective manner. But the current state of affairs was also 
reproachable. The constant resource and workflow optimizations in Danish healthcare 
had resulted in the near absence of slack resources at the hospital. The clinicians tended 
to feel that all their resources were tied up in their performance of their day-to-day 
activities. Few had the resources necessary to engage in change efforts, such as the new 
practices intended to shorten fasting times. To the hospital, this meant that it was at risk 
of going solid [9], that is, of becoming more or less incapable of change. 
Fourth, managerial commitment was lacking at the department level. The fasting-
time project was supported by hospital top management, which advocated the project 
and its use of the whiteboard. Top management also met with management at the 
department level to obtain their commitment to the project and negotiate the terms of 
their participation. However, the departments enjoyed a high degree of discretion, 
which is common in hospitals [8]. In practice, top management could not order the 
departments to participate in the project, but merely ask them to do so. While the 
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department managers accepted the project, they remained uncommitted to it, partly due 
to its reliance on the whiteboards. The decision to use the network of whiteboards for 
recording, and visualizing, fasting time was based on the successful use of the 
whiteboard for such purposes in the ED. In the other departments, the whiteboard had 
not been similarly successful. For these departments committing to the fasting-time 
project would also mean committing to turning the whiteboard into a technology that 
was in regular use by the staff, who was already skeptical toward the whiteboard [10]. 
While hospital top management liked the prospect of increasing the adoption of the 
whiteboard through the fasting-time project, it eventually had to accept that the 
department managers were not going to put their weight behind the project. 
In addition to the main factors discussed above, several supplementary factors also 
contributed to the outcome of the project. These included (a) competing priorities such 
as the preparations for the upcoming introduction of a new electronic health record 
across the hospital, (b) difficulty establishing an occasion in the planning of the 
operations where information about fasting times could influence decisions, (c) the 
limited interest in information technology among many of the clinicians, (d) the 
interdepartmental character of the project, which increased its organizational 
complexity compared to the successful use of the whiteboard within the ED, and (e) the 
ripple effect of incomplete fasting-time recordings on the subsequent use of these 
recordings in scheduling the operations, for example at the daily whiteboard meetings. 
5.Conclusion 
In spite of top management support, considerable participatory-design work, and good 
intentions, no one really assumed responsibility for shortening patients’ preoperative 
fasting times. The identified set of mutually reinforcing factors collectively explain 
why nothing changed. The four main reasons are lack of urgency, risk aversion, day-to-
day busyness, and lack of managerial commitment at the department level. 
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